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BEYOND THE CARTESIAN SELF
In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be 
challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) 
that is a proper part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption 
by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one that, on the one hand, 
abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains the significance of the first-person 
perspective so prominent in Descartes’ account. On my view, persons have first-person 
perspectives essentially, and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for 
persons. However, persons have no inner selves or inner agents; they have no parts that 
are selves at all. 
The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real with what is in 
some strict sense mind-independent. The assumption, so widespread today, is that what 
has ontological status can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing 
mental or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I’ll try to show that this 
assumption is traceable to Descartes’ view of minds and bodies, and that it is wrong.
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The legacy of Descartes’ view of the mind has influenced contemporary 
philosophy in ways that extend far beyond Descartes’ own beliefs. The 
received interpretation is that Descartes took mind and body to be distinct 
substances, each of which bears its own kind of property, mental or material. 
Bodies are characterized by being extended in space, and minds are 
characterized by being the locus of all thought and consciousness. According 
to Descartes, no conscious being is extended in space and nothing extended 
in space is a conscious or thinking thing. 
After arguing that the mind is spiritual, Descartes assumed that the mind is 
identical with “the self” (Gaukroger 1997, p. 347). So, I shall assume that the 
words ‘self’, ‘mind’, ‘ego’ and ‘soul’ purport to refer to the same thing. Also, 
like Descartes’, my interest is ontological. I am not here concerned with a 
narrative self or a self as an experiential dimension. Rather, my concern is 
with a self, mind or soul as an entity that is part of a human being1.
Many philosophers reject the distinction between mind and body 
that Descartes draws, but not all do. For example, John Foster takes us 
fundamentally to be non-physical subjects. He says, “Jones and the non-
physical subject to which the pain is attributed in the philosophically 
fundamental account are one and the same”2. And numerous contemporary 
views that reject Descartes’ dualism have elements that are noticeably 
Cartesian: Consider, for example, Chisholm’s theory of knowledge based on 
what is directly evident to the mind, or Fodor’s view of the mind as having 
“narrow” content that is wholly independent of the “external world”, or 
Galen Strawson’s materialist version of inner selves. These views all share 
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* A previous version of this paper was presented at the conference on  
“The Cartesian ‘Myth of the Ego’ and the Analytic/Continental Divide”, Radboud 
University, Nijmegen, 3-4 September, 2010. 
1 A neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio, infers from what he takes to be two kinds of 
consciousness, for which he claims empirical support, that there are two kinds of self: 
core self and autobiographical self, which he takes to be our traditional notion of the 
self and to be linked to our idea of personal identity (Damasio 1999, pp. 16-17). I see no 
reason to make any inference about selves from hypotheses about consciousness. In 
any case, neither of these kinds of self would be what I am discussing here.
2 Foster J., The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Conception of the Mind, 
Routledge, London 1991, p. 238.
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the Cartesian idea of a solitary self that is completely self-enclosed and 
independent of everything else.
In this talk, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption 
to be challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or 
immaterial) that is a part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this 
assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one 
that, on the one hand, abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains 
the significance of the first-person perspective so prominent in Descartes’ 
account. On my view, persons have first-person perspectives essentially, 
and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for persons. 
However, persons are not, and do not have, inner selves or inner agents; they 
have no parts that are selves at all.
The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real 
with what is, in some strict sense, mind-independent. The assumption, 
widespread today in analytic philosophy, is that what has ontological status 
can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing mental 
or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I’ll try to show that 
this assumption is traceable to Descartes’ view of minds and bodies, and that 
it is wrong.
By “No Solitary Selves”, I mean a conjunction of two theses: (1) There are no 
selves that are mental, nonmaterial parts of persons; and (2) Persons – the 
bearers of mentality – are not solitary; it is impossible for a world to contain a 
single person and nothing else. So, no selves, and no solitary persons.
First, I’ll argue that there are no selves or minds as parts of persons. My 
strategy is to show that there is no need to postulate selves as parts of 
persons: the mental aspects of persons do not need special subpersonal or 
immaterial bearers.
On my view, all persons have first-person perspectives essentially. 
Newborn human babies, like chimpanzees and other higher mammals, have 
rudimentary first-person perspectives; then as an infant grows and learns a 
language, she develops a robust first-person perspective. All normal mature 
human persons have robust first-person perspectives. A robust first-person 
perspective is a conceptual ability, an ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, 
from the first-person without recourse to a name, description or other third-
person referring device.
Here’s a true story that illustrates a toddler who has developed a robust 
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first-person perspective: when one of my nieces was two years old, she had a 
birthday party to which her many cousins were invited. One of her cousins (his 
name was Donald) went into her bedroom and began systematically taking toys 
out of my niece’s toybox. When my niece saw what was happening, she was 
outraged. She cried out, “Dammit, Donald, mine!” Her parents were appalled: 
Where, they wondered with embarrassment, had she learned the profanity 
“dammit”? What interested me, however, was not her saying “dammit”, but her 
competent use of the word “mine”. She had a robust first-person perspective 
of herself: she knew that she – she herself – was the rightful owner of the toys, 
and that her permission was required for anyone else to play with her toys. This 
little story illustrates, I think, what is unique about human persons. Of all the 
beings in the world, we alone have robust first-personal perspectives. We alone 
can conceive of ourselves from “within,” so to speak; we can think of ourselves 
without the need to identify ourselves by means of any description, name, or 
other third-person referring device.
My niece’s shouting – “Dammit, Donald, mine!” – is a clear manifestation of a 
robust first-person perspective. A robust first-person perspective is typically 
manifested in English by first-person clauses embedded in first-person 
sentences with psychological or linguistic main verbs – e.g., “I believe that 
I am in Holland” or “I’m glad that I am here”. The second occurrence of “I” 
(which I mark with an asterisk, as “I*”) is the expression of a robust first-person 
perspective. Contrast “I wonder whether I* have enough money to retire” with 
“I wonder whether Lynne Baker has enough money to retire”. A robust first-
person perspective is the ability to distinguish between thinking about oneself 
as oneself and thinking about someone who just happens to be oneself.
A robust first-person perspective, as I am using the term3, brings with it an 
awareness of one’s own thoughts as one’s own and makes possible an interior 
life, but as the above examples show, a robust first-person perspective is 
not just subjective. It also brings with it an awareness of one’s own material 
possessions as one’s own. I won’t try to survey all the ways that we manifest 
our robust first-person perspectives. Suffice it to say that a first-person 
perspective, as the defining element of persons, attaches to whole entities, 
not just to parts of them.
Human persons, the bearers of robust first-person perspectives, are 
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from the first-person perspective and fail to realize that the happening occurs to oneself” 
(Zahavi 2005, p. 126).
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necessarily embodied. If you grieve for your friend who died, I may see the 
grief on your face or in your step. The sadness in your eyes is not just caused 
by your grief; it’s part of your grief. No part of you – brain or mind – is the 
subject of your grief; you are. We whole persons are constituted by whole 
bodies. Brains have a special role in providing the mechanisms that make 
possible our mental lives. But it is not my brain itself that would like to go 
on a river cruise; it is not my brain that regrets having offended you. I did 
it; I regret it. And I am not identical to a brain. Neither brains nor minds are 
subjects of experience or are rational or moral agents; we persons are.
Although we are essentially embodied, we do not essentially have the bodies 
that we now have. Our bodies can be made of anything – organic material, 
silicon, whatever – as long as they provide the mechanisms that support 
our person-level activities and states. The relation between us and our 
bodies is constitution – the same relation that a statue has to the piece of 
bronze that constitutes it. We are constituted by our bodies, and the bodies 
that constitute us now are organisms. With enough neural implants, brain-
machine interfaces, and prosthetic limbs, we may come to be constituted 
by nonorganic bodies. What is required for our continued existence is the 
continued exemplification of our first-person perspectives, along with some 
kind of body that has mechanisms capable or doing our our brains do.
In short, although human persons are essentially embodied, what makes us 
unique are our robust first-person perspectives. Descartes was exactly right 
about the importance of the first-person point of view. But he was mistaken, 
I think, in two ways that are often linked to a first-person point of view. First, 
Descartes thought that he himself could exist in isolation – that even if he 
were alone in the world with an Evil Genius, he could entertain the thought 
that he was sitting in his dressing gown in front of the fire. I’ll discuss this 
point in the next section. Second, the other way that Descartes was mistaken 
was in supposing that his thinking required that he have a substantial mind 
or self. However, first-person perspectives do not require a substantial 
mind or a self. First-person perspectives are properties that may well have 
evolved by natural selection. We know from Darwin that the animal kingdom 
is a seamless whole, and it is not a stretch to imagine that first-person 
perspectives emerged from non-human organisms. (After all, non-human 
animals have rudimentary first-person perspectives.) When brains evolved 
to the point of being able to support robust first-person perspectives, a new 
kind of being came into existence, persons: perhaps not biologically new, 
but ontologically new – beings with new kinds of causal powers (e.g., causal 
powers to learn complicated syntax and to form complex organizations to 
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govern the transfer of property). There is simply no need, or even a place, 
for a self or mind as distinct from a person. To be a person, on my view, is 
already to have a first-person perspective. Any further self or mind would be 
gratuitous.
(2) Having argued against selves or minds as parts of persons, I now want 
to argue against the other half of “No Solitary Selves”. I want to show that 
persons, who are subjects of experience and agents responsible for what 
they do, cannot exist in total isolation. Even if Descartes could have had the 
thought that he was the only thing that existed in the world, that thought 
could not have been true. The ability to think of oneself as oneself – a robust 
first-person perspective – has relational presuppositions that require the 
existence of other things besides the thinker. 
There is empirical support for the social character of beings like us. The 
psychologist Michael Tomasello gave cognitive tests to 2-year old human 
beings, and to adult orangutans and chimpanzees, and found that the only 
places in which the human beings outscored the non-human primates were 
on tests that measured social skills: social learning, communicating and 
reading the intentions of others.
Human beings – Tomasello said – have evolved to coordinate complex 
activities, to gossip and to playact together. It is because they are adapted for 
such cultural activities – and not because of their cleverness as individuals 
– that human beings are able to do so many exceptionally complex and 
impressive things4.
Moreover, a robust first-person perspective is developmentally subsequent 
to a great deal of social and linguistic interaction. It emerges from a 
rudimentary first-person perspective along with awareness of others (e.g., 
caregivers) as conscious beings. It seems to develop from the phenomenon 
of “shared attention”, in which the infant aligns his/her gaze with his/her 
mother’s. When infants notice a divergence between their own attention 
and the mother’s, they become aware of their mother as a conscious being. 
The activities of shared attention are necessary precursors of learning a 
language5. And it is only in a public language that a robust first-person 
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4 “How are Humans Unique?” http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/05/25/
magazine/25wwln-essay-t.html?8br Accessed July 28, 2010.
5 According to Michael Tomasello , The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA 1999), ch. 4.
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perspective is manifest to others.
Now I want to ratchet up the argument from a mere de facto argument 
about social and linguistic interaction to a modal argument. But first, some 
preliminaries: I’ll use the notion of concepts to individuate thoughts. If you 
don’t like that notion, individuate thoughts in some other way, but you’ll 
have to individuate thoughts in a way that distinguishes the thought that 
snow is white from the thought that snow is the colour of a cockatoo. I’ll 
use the word “concept” to apply to propositional contents of thoughts, 
canonically expressed by “that”-clauses. For example, the thought that 
grass is green contains the concepts grass and green. I do not intend the term 
“concept” to carry theoretical weight. I am simply using the term in order 
to identify constituents of thoughts, the items that make up the contents of 
thoughts and determine the identity of thoughts. Canonical attributions of 
thoughts contain concepts that the thinker actually has.
Now apply this way of individuating thoughts to the notion of a first-person 
perspective. In order to have a robust first-person perspective, you must 
be able consciously to conceive of yourself as yourself, to be aware that it 
is yourself qua yourself that you are conceiving of. Call the self-concept in 
thoughts that manifest your robust first-person perspective, an “I*-concept”. 
Your thought that you would express by saying, “I wish that I were a movie 
star” contains the concepts wish, movie star and your I*-concept.
To show that you cannot have a robust first-person perspective in isolation, 
I need to show that you cannot have an I*-concept in isolation. Here is the 
argument:
No Robust FPP in Isolation
1. Necessarily, if x has a robust fpp, then x has an I*-concept of herself.
2. Necessarily, if x has an I*-concept of herself, then x has a public 
language.
3. Necessarily, if x has a public language, then x has social and linguistic 
relations.
4. Necessarily, if x has a robust fpp, then x has social and linguistic 
relations.
Since the argument is obviously valid, we need only check to see whether the 
premises are true.
Premise 1 is a conceptual truth that follows from the characterization of a 
first-person perspective and the method of individuating thoughts that I 
proposed. An I*-concept is a “formal” (not a qualitative) concept: its role is to 
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refer to its user from a first-person point of view – in such a way that the user 
of an I*-concept cannot be mistaken about who she is referring to.
Premise 2: An I*-concept does not stand alone; it cannot be the only concept 
in one’s conceptual repertoire. One cannot have an I*-concept unless one has 
a store of ordinary empirical, qualitative concepts that one can differentially 
apply to oneself and others. Canonically, the person attributes to herself some 
psychological or linguistic state (believing, wanting, intending, hoping, saying 
and so on) that has qualitative content (e.g., “I hope that I* won the election”). 
And qualitative content is conveyed by ordinary empirical concepts – like 
winning, milk, sleep, sitting, hurt, apple. Unlike an I*-concept, such qualitative 
concepts can be correctly applied to various things, and they also can be 
misapplied. The difference between correct and incorrect application of an 
ordinary empirical concept is grounded in public language. As Wittgenstein 
said, without a public language, there would be no application conditions to 
ground a difference between using a concept correctly and using it incorrectly.
One cannot make up one’s own application conditions for a concept. Suppose that 
a nonlinguistic Robinson Crusoe finds himself stranded alone on an island and it 
occurs to him to call the sea creatures he sees, “sharks”. How could Crusoe’s use 
of the sound “shark” express one concept rather than another? In the absence 
of a language, what would make it the case that any of Crusoe’s mental events 
or vocalizations expressed any concept – shark or fish or anything else6? Crusoe’s 
putative concept does not have an extension that would make his use of what 
sounds like “shark” on a given occasion right or wrong7. Whatever seems right to 
him is right: “And – as Wittgenstein said – that only means that here we can’t talk 
about right”8. So, what sounds like “shark” does not express a qualitative concept.
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6 There are 350 species of sharks that are radically dissimilar in appearance from 
one another. Some sharks have anal fins; others don’t. Some sharks have flat raylike 
bodies; others don’t; and so on. Sharks range in size from a few centimeters to 
(perhaps) 18 meters long. Some sharks with raylike bodies have elongated, sawlike 
snouts; others with raylike bodies have short, un-sawlike snouts. Some sharks have 
6 or 7 gill slits and one dorsal fin; others have 5 gill slits and 2 dorsal fins. Some 
sharks have dorsal fin spines; others have no fin spines. Of the sharks without fin 
spines, some have mouths behind their eyes, and others have mouths well in front 
of their eyes. The whale shark (Rhiniodon typus) is the world’s largest fish. Sharks, 
John D. Stevens, editor (Facts on File, Inc., New York 1987), pp. 18-35.
7 I have been influenced by Kripke here. In virtue of what would a person, 
considered in isolation, mean addition rather than “quaddition” by “+”? See Saul 
A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Natural Language (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1982).
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, par. 258.
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What’s true of the concept expressed by the English word “shark” is also 
true of more mundane empirical concepts that are needed for thoughts that 
contain an I*-concept. For example, for my niece to wish that she* had more 
toys, she would have to have an I*-concept and the qualitative concept toy. 
Acquisition of the concept toy requires a public language. (“That’s not a toy; 
put it down and be careful with it”, her mother would tell my niece if she 
picked up a fragile vase.)
In short: In order to have an I*-concept, one must have a store of empirical 
concepts whose acquisition depends on a public language – at least for beings 
like us. 
Premise 3: As just suggested, in order to acquire the empirical concepts 
expressed by a public language, the learner has to stand to be corrected; and 
to stand to be corrected is to have social and linguistic relations. So, anyone 
who has a public language must have social and linguistic relations to others.
Given its validity and the support for its three premises, I think that we can 
take the argument for “no-robust-first-person-perspective-in-isolation” to be 
sound and the conclusion to be true.
If my argument is correct, then it is impossible for any entity that was truly 
alone in the world to have a robust first-person perspective. And nothing that 
lacked a robust first-person perspective could have thoughts about herself as 
herself. So, Descartes’ resolution to regard himself as having “no hands, no eyes, 
no flesh, no blood, no senses” is not a thought that Descartes could have had 
if it had been true: the very fact that he had that thought (if he could have 
had it) would guarantee that it was false. Solipsism is a philosopher’s fantasy. 
Individual human beings – persons – are social entities through and through. 
In the absence of communities, there would be no persons: human organisms, 
perhaps, but no persons, no individuals who could reflect on themselves as 
themselves.
So, a first-person perspective – not a substantial self or ego – is what is crucial 
for the existence of persons and their self-reflection. There would be no 
phenomenology without a robust first-person perspective. There would be no 
inner life at all. Nevertheless, the notion of a robust first-person perspective 
that I have discussed is clearly non-Cartesian. Entities cannot have robust 
first-person perspectives unless they have numerous linguistic and social 
relations by which to acquire a store of ordinary empirical concepts to apply 
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to themselves and to others. Consequently, I suggest that we dissociate the 
idea of the first-person perspective from the Cartesian ideas of transparency, 
infallibility and logical privacy. 
In sum, on my account of persons, solitary selves are gratuitous. Persons 
are neither solitary, nor do they have parts that are substantial selves or 
minds. The person herself – embodied and embedded in an environment – 
essentially has a first-person perspective and is the subject of experience and 
the agent who is responsible for her deeds. Both these Cartesian errors (as 
I think of them) – the possibility of solitary thinkers and the need for a self 
or mind – are closely related to what Descartes was right about, namely, the 
ineliminable importance of a first-person perspective.
The assumption that reality is mind-independent is what is known as 
“metaphysical realism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines 
“metaphysical realism” as “the world is as it is independently of how humans 
take it to be”9. 
How do we get from Descartes to such a view? Well, one of the achievements 
of The Meditations was to establish corporeal nature as completely distinct 
from the mind, and as completely distinct from, but dependent on, God. “By 
starting from those ideas of the corporeal world which are genuinely clear 
and distinct, Descartes arrives at a mechanistic picture of how the world is 
to be described at a most fundamental level” (Gaukroger 1997, p. 352). The 
physical world is a “self-sufficient mechanistic system” (Carriero 2009, p. 
18). Descartes’ the metaphysical legitimation of mechanism, together with 
the divorce of the mind from the corporeal world, lays the groundwork for 
the assumption that corporeal reality is wholly mind-independent. And with 
the later turn to materialism, minds themselves – now thought of as brains 
– are likewise mind-independent. So, reality tout court is thought of as mind-
independent.
However, I believe that metaphysical realism is entirely wrong-headed. We 
live in a world full of objects whose existence depends ontologically (not just 
causally) on intentions and conventions – from legal documents, to economic 
instruments like credit cards, to manufactured tools, to artworks. Such objects 
could not exist in a world lacking entities (like us) who have intentions and 
create conventions. I call such objects “intention-dependent” or “ID” objects.
2.
The assumption 
that reality is 
mind-independent
9 Semantic Challenges to Realism, Drew Khlentzos. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-sem-challenge) Accessed January 29, 2010.
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To see that the dependence of ID objects on beings with intentions is 
ontological and not merely causal, consider making a solid gold sphere that 
weighed 100 kg. The gold sphere would be causally dependent on beings with 
intentions, but not ontologically dependent on them. In another possible 
world, there could be naturally occurring gold spheres weighing 100 kg. 
Contrast this with building a boat. Nothing is a boat unless its intended 
function is to travel across water. If by quantum accident, matter coalesced 
in outer space that was indistinguishable from the boat that won the 2010 
America’s Cup, the matter in outer space would not be a boat. Unlike the 100 
kg gold sphere, which is causally dependent on the existence of beings with 
intentions, a boat, like any other artifact, is not just causally, but ontologically 
dependent on the existence of beings with intentions. Hence, unlike the gold 
sphere, the boat is an ID object.  
Since intentions are included in what we call “minds”, ID objects are mind-
dependent. (I think of minds as the mental aspects of persons.) Some 
philosophers want to draw a mind-independent/mind-dependent line 
between subjective phenomena like dreams and afterimages and everything 
else. But it could not be right to call objects that are ontologically dependent 
on the existence of beings with intentions mind-independent. Doing so 
just conflates a mind-independent/mind-dependent distinction with an 
objective/subjective distinction. To see that these are different distinctions, 
consider: it is an objective fact that some boats are propelled by motors; if 
you deny that some boats are propelled by motors, you are making as much 
a mistake as if you thought that the earth was flat. And the objectivity of this 
fact is not threatened by the likewise objective fact that there could be no 
boats in a world without minds. There are objective facts about ID objects, 
whose existence depends on intentions (i.e., on mental phenomena). Hence, 
objectivity and mind-independence are not equivalent. If we are going to 
include artifacts and artworks in reality (as artefacts and artworks), then we 
cannot take reality to be confined to what is mind-independent.
This discussion suggests another consequence of Descartes’ framework that 
should be rejected: the consequence that takes minds to be were purely 
subjective and the material world to be purely objective. We have now seen 
from both sides the infelicity of the equation of mind with pure subjectivity 
and of the material world with pure objectivity. On the mind-side, the 
contents of our thoughts are not ontologically independent of the material 
world (our water-thoughts are not independent of the existence of H2O). 
And on the material-world side, the material world contains much that is not 
ontologically independent of our thoughts (artefacts and artworks). Mind and 
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10 I have discussed the difference between ontology at a time and ontology simpliciter 
in The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, and I cannot take it up here.
11  For a discussion of ontological novelty, see The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, pp. 234-239.
world are thoroughly implicated in each other, and can be disentangled only 
conceptually.
We persons are part of the natural world as much as electrons are. And there 
is no reason that we cannot contribute to basic reality by our intentional 
activity. I am told that this idea cannot be part of “serious metaphysics” or 
“fundamental ontology”. But the only basis that I see for this objection is a 
prior commitment to a “ready-made world” (in Ted Sider’s phrase)10.  Since 
I believe that there is ontological novelty in the world, I do not share this 
commitment11.
With the rejection of the idea of a solitary self, I have replaced two Cartesian 
convictions: there is no pure self contingently connected to the so-called 
“external world” by the senses, and hence no pure self can form the self-
evident starting point of a philosophical system. With the rejection of the 
idea of reality as mind-independent, I have rejected a contemporary idea 
that reality can be understood as what Descartes would have thought of as 
the “external” world. Whether this puts me any closer to the continental 
philosophers, I leave for you to decide.
3.
Conclusion
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